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Evidence of Character.
In an action for damages for the wrongful killing of plaintiff's husband, it is proper to exclude evidence offered by defendant to prove his
general reputation as an honest, peaceable, and law-abiding citizen.
EVIDENCE OV CHARACTER AND REPUTATION.
the contrary; and then evidence
may in turn be offered to rebut the
latter, and so support the character
assailed: Tibbs v. Brown, 2 Grant
(Pa.), 39; McCabe v.- Platter, 6
Blackf. (Ind.), 405; Harm v.Wilson,
28 Ind., 296; Dame v. Kenney, 25
N. H., 318: Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51
Vt., 501.
The normal operation of this rule
is most clearly seen in the'case of a
witness. His character is presumed
truthful, and cannot, therefore, be
proved to be so for the purpose of
corroborating his testimony until it
has been assailed; but when once
this has been done, whether successfully or not, evidence of his
reputation for truth is admissible to
rebut that attack: Peo. v. Hulse, 3
Hill, 3o9; Harks v. Peo., 5 Denio,
io3; Braddle v. Brownfield, 9 Watts,
124; Wertz v. May, 21 Pa., 274;
Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill. 263;
Com. v. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.),
46. Wherever good character is admissible in chief it is to rebut some
direct or implied attack in the
pleadings or form of action. A
charge of misappropriating funds,
Falkner v. Behr, 75 Ga., 671, of

I. The GeneralPrincipleswhich
Govern the Admissibility of such
Evidence.- (i) Evidence of character, or of reputation, which proves
character, can only be offered by
way of rebuttal, either of the legal
presumption in favor of good character, of prior evidence assailing
character, or of an attack upon it
arising directly or by implication
from the pleadings or form of action. This is the cardinal principle
that underlies this branch of the
law of evidence, and it follows necessarily that, in general, evidence
of bad character only is admissible
in chief, and evidence of good character cannot be given unless it has
first been assailed. The reason of
this is perfectly clear. The law presumes every man's character to be
good until the contrary is proven;
and as all evidence of good character would, therefore, be merely cumulative, it is accordingly rejected
as unnecessary, and as forcing upon
the opposite party a side issue which
he alone has the right to niake.
But this may be rebutted, in common with all otherpresumptions of
fact, by evidence tending to prove

I Reported in 20 S. W. Rep., 689.
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cruel and disgraceful conduct in a
divorce suit, DuBose v. DuBose, 75
Ga., 753, or of adultery, O'Bryan
v. O'Bryan, 13 Mo., i6; S. C., 53
Am. Dec., 128, will render it competent for the party assailed to
prove his good character,; and it is
also admissible to establish want of
probable cause in malicious prosecution: Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush.
(Mass.), 217.
In criminal cases the good character of the defendant may always
be shown, for the very accusation
under which lie labors is an assault
upon it: Peo. v. Garbutt, 17 Mich.,
9; Hanney v. Com., I6 Pa., 323;
S. C., 9 AtI. Rep., 339.
EMvidence of bad character is, of
course, admissible in all cases to
rebut the presumption of good
character; but it cannot be introduced in cases where the latter is
assailed by the pleadings or form of
action,, .unless evidence has been
given to support it, or unless it has
a direct bearing upon the issue, and
so tends to rebut the averments of
the other side. It cannot be introduced in criminal cases to impugn
the defendant unless he first gives
evidence to prove his character
good; but it can be given to attack
a plaintiff in libel or slander, so as
to mitigate the damages, for it goes
directly to the amount of injury
suffered: Stone v. Varney, 7 Metc.
(Mass.), 86; and to assail the female
in a prosecution for rape, Turney's
Case, 8 S. & M. (Miss.), io4; State
7'. Forshore, 43 N. H., 89, or in seduction, Wilson v. Sprowl, 3 Pa.,
49; Stowell v. Beagle, 79 Ill., 257,
because she #sserts her good character by the action. And in cases
of homicide the defendant may. if
he plead self-defense, offer evidence
of the dangerous character of the
deceased to rebut the presumption

arising from the killing: Abernethy
v. Com., IOI Pa., 322.
(2) Closely connected with this is
the second principle, that evidence
of character can only be given
when it has a direct bearing upon
the issue. It is on this ground that
evidence of the character of the
parties to a civil suit is rejected in
all cases except those in which it is
material, or, as is technically said,
is put in issue: Gebhart 'v. Burkett,
57 Ind., 378.
Evidence of the bad reputation of
a witness for truth has a direct
bearing upon his credibility; evidence of the good character of a
defendant has a direct bearing upon
the question whether or not it is
likely that he would commit the
crime charged; evidence of evil
reputation tends to prove the
amount of injury suffered by a libel
or slander; and evidence of the
character of a murdered man
bears very strongly upon.the question whether or not the defendant
had reason to fear injury to life or
limb. All these are, therefore, admissible in proper cases.
(3) A thira principle is that the
evidence of reputation offered must
correspond to the issue to which it
relates, or the particular trait of
character assailed. This is simply
the old rule that evidence must be
confined to the point in issue. When
it is sought to impeach a witness
the issue is as to his veracity, and
the evidence should be confined to
his reputation for truthfulness or,
at the furthest, to his general moral
character, and evidence of a bad
reputation for any specific trait of
character other than that involved
should not be admitted. Certainly,
proof that he was a drunkard or a
fornicator would not prove him a
liar.
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A reputation for dishonesty cannot rebut a reputation for peace
and quiet; a reputation for unchastity cannot affect a reputation for
honesty; a reputation for untruthfulness cannot refute evidence of a
reputation for chastity; and a reputation for quarreling and turbulence
cannot disprove a reputation for
truthfulness. And equally, when
the character of the deceased is in
issue in homicide, no amount of
proof of honesty or dishonesty,
truthfulness or untruthfulness,
chastity or unchastity, can make
him out either a peaceable or a dangerous man; and the inquiry must,
therefore, be strictly confined to his
reputation for peace and quiet: Abernethy v. Com., Ioi Pa., 322.
(4) The fourth principle is that
evidence of reputation to beadmissible must be general, at least in the
community where the individual
resides oris best known at the time.
It need not, of course, be invariably
from the place of his present residence, for he may have been there
too short a time to be generally
known; or it may be impossible to
obtain witnesses from that locality.
This is a matter that cannot be reduced to inflexible rules, and must
of necessity be largely in the discretion of the trial court. But it
cannot be proved by reputation current only in one or another circle
or clique of his friends, acquaintances or neighbors-it must be in
the community at large; and cannot
be proved by evidence of specific
acts, for isolated instances cannot make a reputation: Rattaree
v. Chapman (Ga.), 4 S. E. Rep.,
684. Upon the same ground rumors
and opinions are inadmissible:
Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q. B. D., 491;
Hussey v. State, 87 Ala,, 121 ; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 420. But the char-

acter of a man, as proving his fitness or unfitness for a position of
trust, may be attached by proof of
specific acts, though his reputation
may not: Baulec v. R. R., 59 N. Y.,
356.
Just as the place so also the time
of reputation depends largely on
circumstances and rests in the discretion of the Court. No invariable
rule can be laid down in regard to
it. Of course, it must be reasonable,
and should be as near as possible
to the time of trial, for reputation
may change; and yet it does not,
under
ordinary
circumstances,
change so rapidly that an interval
of months, or even years, will of
necessity render proof of it at that
time inadmissible.
It should, of
course, be ante litem motam, except
in the case of a witness; because
the issue relates to that time, and
the libel or the charge of crime may
have affected it injuriously: Reid
v. Reid, 2 C. E. Green (N. 3.),
1O.

(5) The fifth principle needs no
argument to prove its validity. It
is that evidence of the character of
third parties shall never be given,
unless it is material to the issue.
Evidence of the character of one
under whom the plaintiff claims in
ejectment is inadmissible: Blackburn v. Holliday, 12 S. & R., 140.
So of an accomplice who is a stranger to the record: Walls v. State,
125 Ind., 4oo; of a woman with
whom defendant lived: Peo. v.
Sweeney, 55 Mich., 586; and of de
fendant's wife in a prosecution for
attempting to levy blackmail by
accusing the prosecutor of seducing
her: McMillan v. State, 6o Ind.,
216. On the trial of a husband for
attempting to murder his wife, evidence that the wife was unchaste is
incompetent: Coin. v. Sapp (Ky.),
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14 S. W. Rep., 8 4. But when the
defendant was assaulted by deceased
and his companion, evidence of the
bad character of the companion is
admissible: Tiffany v. Com., [21
Pa., 165; S. C., 15 Atl. Rep.,
462. And in an action for damages for an injury occurring
through the negligence of an employee, the character of the employee is in issue, as showing negligence on the part of his employer,
and may be proved: Frazier vz.
R. R., 38 Pa., 104; Cook v. Parham,
24 Ala., 21.
See, however, Baulec
v. R. R., 59 N. Y., 356.
(6) The last principle is that
which permits the evidence of good
reputation to be negative. It tests
in sound common sense. As has
been repeatedly said, the best characters are those which are least
talked about; and the less fault
that is found with a man the better
his reputation. Accordingly, evidence of good character may be
shown by the testimony of a witness that he never heard a person's
reputation discussed, or never
heard anything said against it.
Reg. v. Cary, io CoX, C. C., 25.
(7) It is hardly necessary to add
that the witness to reputation must
show that he is acquainted with it;
though he need not personally
know the individual to whose reputation he testifies. Redden v.
Tefft (Kan.), 29 Pac. Rep., i57;
State v. Turner (S. C.), .i5 S. E.
Rep., 602.

II. The A#plicalicn of these
Principiles to Spiecial Cases. (A)
Proof of Rep utation of Witnesses.
-(i) As was said above, the credibility of a witness' testimony cannot be supported by evidence that
his character for truth and veracity
is good, until that character has
been assailed by the opposite party;

but when that has been done, evidence of his good character may
then be adduced to rebut it: Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. (Mass.),
143; Harrington v. Lincoln, 4
Gray (Mass.), 563; Heywood v.
Reid, 4 Gray (Mass.), 574; Attwood v. Dearborn, i Allen (Mass.),
483; Johnson v. State, 21 Ind.,
329; Brand v. Campbell, 86 Ind.,
516; Fitzgerald v. Goff, 99 Ind.,
28; Kitteringham v. Dance, 58
Iowa, 632; Cross v. Rutledge, 8I
Ill., 266; Haines v. Peo., 82 Ill.,
43o ; Tedens i. Schumers, 112 Ill.,
263; Peo. v. Rector, 19 Wend., 569;
Peo. v. Gay, -7 N. Y., 378; Rogers
v. Moore, io Conn., 13; Vernon v.
Tucker, 30 Md., 456; State v.
Cooper,
E Mo., 436; State v.
Thomas, 78 Mo., 327; Peo. v. Hulse,
3 Hill, 3o9; Harks v. Peo., 5 Denio,
1o3'; Peo. v. Van Houter, 38 Hun.
(N. Y.), 168; Braddie v. Brownfield,
9 Watts, 124; Werts v. May, 21 Pa.,
274; Turner v. Com., 86 Pa., 54;
R. R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Ala., 168;
Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga., 450;
Vance v. Vance, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 583;
Peo. v. Bush, 65 Cal., 129; Saussy
v. R. R., 22 Fla., 327; Morgan v.
State, 88 Ala., 223, S. C., 6So. Rep.,
76r; State v. Jones (S. C.), 7 S. E.
Rep., 296; and it makes no difference in this regard whether the
attempt at impeaching the character is successful or unsuccessful ;
the evidence of good reputation
is equally admissible in either case.
Com. vz. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.),
46; Wilson v. State, i7 Tex. App.,
525. But if evidence of good character is improperly admitted before
it has been assailed, the judgment
will not be reversed on this ground
alone, as the evidence, being
merely cumulative, could not be
productive of any substantial injury. Green v. State (Tex.), 12 S.
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XV. Rep.,'872. If, however, it could
be shown to have in any way
materially affected the result,
this reasoning could not apply, and
the judgment would doubtless be
reversed.
(2) A mere conflict of testimony
is not an attack upon reputation;
and, therefore, is not a sufficient
ground for admitting evidence of
the good reputation of the, witness
whose testimony is contradicted.
A contradiction does not imply
Priutt v.
want of truthfulness.
CoX, 21 Ind., 15 ; Russell v. Coffin,
8 Pick. (Mass.), 143; Cupp V. Com.
(Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep., 405; Rushing
v.State (Tex.), 8 S. V. Rep., 807;
Britt v. State (Tex.), 17 S. \V.
Rep., 255; Chic. & Alton R. R. v.
Fisher, 31 Ill. App., 36; Tedens v.
Schumers, 112 Ill., 263. Nor is this
the case even when evidence is
given that the witness has made
material false statements, though
this practically involves a charge
of perjury. Brown v. Movers, 6
Gray (Mass.), 451. But an apparent
exception to this rule was allowed
in Crook v. State, 27 Tex. App.,
198; S. C., Ii S. W. Rep., 444, in
favor of a non-resident witness;
and in Tipton v. State (Tex.), 17
S. W. Rep., 1097, in favor of a
See also
prosecuting witness.
Phillips v. State, i9 Tex. App.,
158.
When the witness has been impeached by proof of specific acts
which affect his credibility, he niay"
rebut it by proof of good moral
character acquired since the time
of the acts proved. Cent. R. R. &
Banking Co. v.Dodd, 83 Ga., 507.
Contra, Zitzer vz.Berkle, 24 Pa.,
410; Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa., 401.
But the reasoning in the former
case is very cogent, and would seem
to establish a juster rule. "A man
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may be guilty of immoral acts in
his youth, and may repent and lead
a pure and moral life ever afterward. It would be unjust to him
to allow this attack to 'be made
upon him, and not to allow him to
show that since that time he has
established among his neighbors a
good character, such as to render
him worthy of belief in a court of
justice."
The attack which will justify
the admission of evidence of good
reputation need not be made by
direct testimony-it may be during
the cross-examination: State v.
Fruge (La.), io S. Rep., 621. But
a mere attack upon the veracity of
a witness by counsel in argument
is no ground for the admission of
testimony to sustain his reputation
in that regard: Tedens v. Schumers,
112 Ill., 263; Ricks v. State, 19 Tex.
App., 308.
(3)As the point in issue in the
impeachment of a witness is his
credibility, the evidence of reputation offered must be such as will
affect that, and should consequently
be of his reputation for truth and
veracity. Bank v. Coots, 3 Cr., C.
C., 169; U. S. v. Vansickle, 2 McLean, C. C., 219; Taylor v.Clendinning, 4 Kan., 524; Boswell v.
Blackman, 12 Ga., 591; Nugent v.
State, iS Ala., 521 ; State v. Randolph, 24 Conn., 363; Fryer v.
Bank, I I II., 367; Crabtree v. Kite,
21 Ill., 180; Phillips v. Kingsfield,
19 Me., 375; State v. Bruce, 24 Me.,
71; Bank v. Hobbs, iiGray (Mass.),
250; Webber v. Hanke, 4 Mich.,
198; Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind., 124;
Herzman v. Oberfelder, 54 Iowa,
83; Atwood v. Impson, 5 C. E.
Green (N. J.), 15o; Rudsdill v.
Iinn., 380; Smith
Slingerland, i8 M
v. State, 58 Iiss., 867; Hoitt V.
Moulton, 21 -N. H., 586; Boon v.
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Wethered,

Tex., 675; Kennedy
442; S.C., IS.
W. Rep., 3o8; Powers v. Leach, 26
Vt., 270; Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt.,
437; Crane v. Thayer, 18 Vt., 168;
Gough v. St. John, I6 Wend., 653;
Fowler v. Ins. Co, 6 Cowen, 675 ;
Townsend v. Graves, 3 Paige, 456;
Church v. Drummond, 7 Ind., 19;
Gebhart v. Burkett, 57 Ind., 380;
Crose v. Rutledge, 8I Ill., 267;
State v,. Howard, 9 N. H., 436;
Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How., 2;
Uhl v. Com., 6 Gratt. (Va.) 706. It
was for a time the prevailing doctrine that impeaching testimony of
a witness' reputation should be
confined to this; but the better
opinion would now seem to be that
evidence of bad moral character in
general is equally admissible, as
tending to affect his credibility:
Majors v. State, 29 Ark., II2; Cline
v. State, 51 Ark., 14o; Peo. v. Beck,
58 Cal., 212; State v. Boswell, 2
Dev. (N. C. L.), 209; Gilliam v.
State, i Head (Tenn.), 38; Ward v.
State, 28 Ala., 53; De Kalb Co. v.
Smith, 47 Ala., 407; McInerny v.
Irvin, go Ala., 275; S. C., 7 So.
Rep., 841: Tacket v. May, 2 Dana
(Ky.), 79; Blue v. Kibby, i T. B.
Monroe (Ky.), I95; State v. Hart
(Iowa), 25 N. W. Rep., 99; State
v. Hamilton, 55 Mo., 520; State v.
Breeden, 58 MO., 5o7; State v. Clinton, 67 Mo., 386; State v. Miller,
71 Mo., 59o; State v. Parker (Mo.),
9 S. W. Rep., 728. Even when the
witness is a defendant testifying in
his own behalf: State v. Broderick,
6i Vt., 421; S. C., 17 Atl. Rep., 716;
23

v. Upshaw, 66 Tex.,

Keyes v. State, 122 Ind., 527; S. C.,
23 N. . Rep., 1o97; Drew v. State,
124 Ind., 9; S. C., 23 N. E. Rep.,

io98; State v. Day, ioo Mo., 242. In
some States evidence of general
moral character is made admissible
to impeach a witness by express

5o5, I803;
statute: R. S. Ind., i88i,
Parley z. State, 57 Ind., 333; Iowa
Code,
3694; State v. Egan, 59
Iowa, 636.
(4) This impeaching reputation,
however, cannot go beyond proof
of general bad reputation; and cannot be of specific traits other than
veracity, as chastity: Evans v.
Smith, 17 Am. Dec., 74, n., p. 77;
Bolles v. State, 46 Ala., 204; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala., 83; Motes
v. Bates, 8o Ala., 382; Davenport v.
State, 85 Ala., 336; Mclnerny v.
Irvin, 9o Ala., 275; S. C., 7 So.
Rep., 841; Com. v. Churchill, ii
Metc. (Mass.), 538; Peo. v. Yslas,
27 Cal., 63o; Weathers v. Barksdale,
3o Ga., 888; M&riman v. State, 3
Lea (Tenn.), 393; Ford v. Jones, 62
Barb. (N. Y.), 484; Kilburn v. Mullen, 22 Iowa, 498; Spears v. Forest,
15 Vt., 435; Cline v. State, 51 Ark.,
140; State v . Larkin, ii Nev., 330;
Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts, 380;
or intemperance: Brindle v. MncIvaine, xo S. & R., 282; Hoitt v.
Moulton, 21 N. H., 586; Thayer v.
Boyle, 3o Me., 475; or turbulence
and violence when intoxicated:
State v. Nelson (Mo.), 14 S. -W.
Rep., 712; S. C., IO Mo., 464. It
has sometimes been held, in opposition to the rule stated above, that
a witness could be impeached by
proof of bad reputation for chastity,
more especially if a woman : State
v. Shields, 13 Mo., 236; State v.
Clawson, 30 Mo. App., 139; Sword
v. Nestor, 3 Dana. (Ky.), 453; R.
R. v. Anthony, 43 Ind., 183; Birmingham Ry. v. Hale, go Ala., 8;
S. C., 8 So. Rep., 142. This latter
distinction, however, is now repudiated in Missouri, and such evidence is permitted to impeach
either sex, though the courts confess that it is in opposition to the
general current of authority: State
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Daly, 12 N. Y. Suppl., 448; S. C.,
58 Hun. (N. Y.), 61o; Moore v.
Moore, 73 Tex., 382; S. C., II S.
V. Rep., 396; State v. Garland, 95
N. C., 671; State v. Gordon, 3 Iowa,
41o; State it. Sterrett, 71 Iowa, 386;
S. C., 32 N. V. Rep., 387; State v.
McGee (Iowa), 46 N. W. Rep., 765;
nor can it be proved by evidence of
reputation among a portion only
of the community: Peo. v. Markham (Cal.), 3o Pac. Rep., 62o, citing Bates v..Barber, 4 Cush. (Mass.),
1o7; and Knode v. Williamson, 17
Vall., 586. See Winter v. R. R.
(Iowa), 45 N. W. Rep., 737.
Au impeachment of reputation
cannot be rebutted by proof that
this reputation is not justified by
the life of the witness: Hollingsworth v. State (Ark.), 14S. W. Rep.,
41- But when a witness has testified to facts that would tend to impeach his character, he may be
cross-examined as to other facts
tending to prove the same trait:
Peo. v. Harrison, 53 N. W. Rep.,
725 ; and the rule does not exclude
evidence of specific acts which impair credibility directly; it only
forbids them to be used as proof of
reputation.
(6) The evidence of a witness's
reputation should geperally have
reference to his character at or near
the time when his testimony is
given, and in the neighborhood
where he then resides: City of
Aurora v. Cobb, 21 Ind., 492; Chance
v. Indianapolis R. R. Co., 32 Ind.,
Cal., io9 ; S. C., 23 Pac. Rep., 371 ;
472; Stratton i. State, 45 Ind.,
Fox v. Com. (Ky.), i S. W. Rep.,
468; Rawles v. State, 56 Ind., 433;
396; Logsdon v. CoM. (Ky.), 12 S.
State v. Johnson, 41 La. An., 574;
W. Rep., 628; State v. Barrett, 40
Long v. State (Neb.), 36 N. W.
Minn., 65; S. C., 41 N. W.. Rep.,
Rep., 31o; State v. Ward (Iowa),
459; Muetze v. Tuteur (Wis.), 46
N. W. Rep., 123; Carthaus z,. State 35 N. W. Rep., 617; Com. v. Hourigan (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep., 55o(Wis.), 47 N. W. Rep., 629; Peo. v.
And the witness should ordinarily
Gibson, 4 N. Y. Suppl., 170; S. C.,
be from the same communuity ai
6 N. Y. Crim. Rep., 390; Gilpin v,

v. Rider, 95 Mo., 486; S. C., 8 S.
W. Rep., 723; State v. Shroyer, io4
Mo., 441; S. C., i6 S. W. Rep., 286.
If admissible at all, such evidence
should be confined to cases where
the prosecuting witness, as in rape
and seduction, exposes her character to attack by the very nature of
the action; and in such cases it is
really the fact'of chastity, and not
the credibility of the witness, that
is assailed by the evidence of reputation for unchastity.
It is an open question whether
evidence is admissible of other
specific traits of character, if connected with evidence of veracity.
It was so held in Heath v. Scott,
65 Cal., 548; but was rejected in
Cline v. State, 51 Ark., I4O. As
the reputation for truth is the main
point, however, the admission of
additional evidence of other traits,
though perhaps techniically error,
would seem to be harmless.
(5) Further, general reputation
cannot be established by proof of
specific acts, whether elicited by
direct or cross-examination: Glaze
v. Blake, 56 Ala., 379; Moore v.
State, 68 Ala., 36o; Smith v. State,
88 Ala., 73; S. C., 7 So. Rep., 52;
Moulton v. State, 88 Ala., 116;
S. C., 6 So. Rep., 758; Morgan
'v. State, 88 Ala., 223; S. C.,
6 So. Rep., 76r; Walker v. State,
(Ala.), 9 So. Rep., 87; Peo. v.
Bowers (Cal.), I8 Pac. Rep., 66o
(by Code.); Jones v. Duchow, 87
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the person to whose character he
testifies: Churton v. Roggen, 67
Barb. (N. Y.), 124; Martin.v. Martin, 25 Ala., 2o ; Dupree 'v. State,
33 Ala., 38o; Davis v. Franke,
33 Gratt. (Va.), 413; Kelley v.
Proctor, 41 N. H., 137; State v. Cox,
67 Mo., 392.
These rules are not iron-clad,
however. It was never meant that in
all cases the inquiry should be restricted to the present abode of the
witness, or to the very day, week,
month, or even year, of the examination. All that is necessary is
that the evidence should relate to
the place where he is best known,
not where, as in the case of a recent
removal, he is an entire, or cbmparative, stranger; and it should
date from a time which, under all
the circumstances, is reasonably
near to the time of the examination:
Coffelt v. State, i9 Tex. App., 436;
Coates v. Sulau (Kans.), 26 Pac.
Rep., 720; State v. Potts, 78 Iowa,
656; S. C., 43 N. W. Rep., 534.
An interval of two months since
a change of residence will not
render evidence of reputation at
the former home incompetent:
Pape v. Wright, ii6 Ind., 502;
S. C., x9 N. E. Rep., 459; nor
one of eighteen months: Thurmond v. State, 27 Tex. App., 347;
nor of four years, where there is no
evidence of the character borne at
the new residence '(and the old is
therefore presumed unchanged?) :
Sleeper v. Van Middlesworth, 4
Denio, 43r. When a witness has
been imprisoned for seven years in
a penitentiary at a distance from
her old home, her previous character can still be testified to by those
who then knew it: for even granting that her character had changed
during that time, they could not
know of it: Sage v. State, 127 Ind.,

15; S. C., 26 N. . Rep., 667. So,
too, when a witness has been long
removed from the State, his prior
character may be testified to by
those who knew it, though no evidence was offered of his present
character; for witnesses to that
could not be obtained: Watkins v.
State, 82 Ga., 231; S. C., 8 S. R.
Rep., 875. But evidence of this
kind should be received with caution, and is not entitled to as much
weight as evidence of present character: Mitchell v. Com., 78 Ky.,
221 ; S. C., 39 Am. Rep., 227; Mynatt v. Hudson, 66 Tex., 66; Lum
v. State, ii Tex. App., 483 ; Nomes
v. Statelor, 17 11., 454; Rathbun
v. Ross, 46 Barb. (N. Y.), 137. It
may be rebutted by proof of present
character:
Mynatt v. Hudson,
supba,; or, if too distant in time,
under the circumstances, may be
rejected altogether. When a witness has lived in one place for five
years next preceding a trial, and is.
well known there, he cannot be
impeached by witnesses from places
wheie he formerly lived: State v.
Potts, 78 Iowa, 656; S. C., 43 N.
W. Rep., 534; Webber v. Hanke,
4 Mich., 198; nor can one who has
lived in the same county for
twenty years be impeached by evidence of a former bad character,
acquired while living in another
State: State v. Parker (Mo.), 9S.
W. Rep., 728. Even two years may
be too long an interval to permit
the introduction of evidence of former character, without proof of
that possessed at present: Mitchell
v. Com., 78 Ky., 221; S. C., 39 Am.
Rep., 227. In general, however,
the question as to reasonableness
of time and place rests in the discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling will not be disturbed unless
it produce manifest injustice: Hol-

AND REPUTATION.
liday v. Cohen, 34 Ark., 707; Cline
v. State, 51 Ark., i4o; S. C., io S.
V. Rep., 225; Snow v. Grace, 29
Ark., 131; Rucker v. Beaty, 3 Bush.
(Ky.), 7o; Manion v. Lambert, io
Bush. (Ky.), 298 ; State v. Howard,
9 N. H., 485; Aurora v. Cobb, 21
Ind., 492 ; Stratton v. State, 45
Ind., 458; R. R. Co., v. Richardson,
66 Ind., 43 ; Kelly v. State, 6r Ala.,
19; Buse v. Page, 32 Minn., iii;
Willard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt.,
393; Wood v. Matthews, 73 Mo.,
477When evidence of the bad reputation of a witness at his present
home has first been shown, it may
be supported by evidence of bad
character at his former residence
also: State v. Espinozei, 2o Nev.,
209; Peo. v. Abbott, 19 Wend., 200;

McMahon v, Harrison, 6 N. Y., 443;
Packet Co. v. McCool, 83 Ind., 392;
and when the present'character has
been shown to be bad, evidence of
previous good character may be
given: Bank v. Hobbs, ii Gray
(Mass.), 250.

(7) A basis for the admission of
evidence ofreputation must be laid
by asking the witness if he knows
it: Peo. v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal., 6Oi;
State v. Wheeler, 104 N. C., 893;
S. C., io S. E. Rep., 491; for if he
is not acquainted with it, of course
he cannot testify to it: Clapp v.
Engledow, 72 Tex., 252; S. C., 1o
S. W. Rep., 462; Redden v. Tefft
(Kan.), 29 Pac. Rep., 157. But it
is not necessary that the witness
should be personally acquainted
with the person .whose reputation
is in question : State v. Turner
(S. C.), 15 S. E. Rep., 602; nor that
be should have heard it talked
about: Flemister v. State (Ga.),
7 S. E. Rep.. 642; First Nat'l Bk.
of Oakland V. Wolff, 79 Cal., 69;
S. C., 21 Pac. Rep., 55i; Nat'l

Bank of Troy v. Serwen, 19 N. Y.
Suppl., 277; for, as a general rule,
the better a man's reputation the
less is said about him: Reg. v.
Cary, io Cox, Cr. Cas., 25; Davis
v. Foster, 68 Ind., 258; Davis v.
Frank, 33 Gratt. (Va.), 413; Hadjo.
v. Gooden, 13 Ala., 718; Childs v.
State, 55 Ala., 28. His knowledge
of character, however, should date
prior to the suit, and if it be only
derived from inquiries or information received/fostliemr vzolam, his
evidence should be rejected: Peo.
v. Fong Ching, 78 Cal., 169; S. C.,
20 Pac. Rep., 396; Griffith v. State,
9o Ala., 583; S. C., 8 So. Rep., 812;
Douglas v. Tousey, 2 Wend., 352;
Reid v. Reid, 17 N. J. Eq., ioi.
(8) The testimony of a witness is
not necessarily to be rejected because his character is -proved bad.
"One who has generally a reputation as a liar may, and often does,
tell the truth." Peo. v. O'Brien
(Mich.), 36 N. W. Rep., 225; Fuller
v. Rounceville, 29 N. H., 555;
Sharp v. State, 16 Ohio St., 218;
Belcher v. Conner, i S. C., 88;
Green v. Cochran, 43 Iowa, 553;
Jernigan v. Wainer, 12 Tex., i89;
Johnson v. Brown, 51 Tex., 65,
State v. Larson (Iowa), 52 N. V.
Rep., .539. But if the impeachment is successful the witness, in
civil actions at least, should be corroborated to be believed: Smyth
v. Oliver, 31 Ala., 39; Adams v.
Adams, 2 C. IE. Green (N. J.), 324;
Watson v. Roode, (Neb.), 46 N. W.
Rep., 491.
(9) When the impeaching witness has testified that he knows the
general reputation of the one who
is sought to be impeached, it is
proper to ask if he would believe
him on his oath, as this does not
call for a mere opinion, but for
what is the necessary consequence
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of his evil reputation: State v.
Johnson (Kan.), 19 Pac. Rep., 749;
Hudspeth v. State (Ark.), 9 S. W.
Rep., i; State v. Christian (La.),
Ii So. Rep., 589; contra, Cline v.
State (Ark.), io S. W. Rep., 225;
S. C., 5i Ark., 14o; Griffin v. State
(Tex.), 9 S. W. Rep., 45 9 . If, however, the question be asked in such
a manner that it appears to call for
the witness' individual opinion,
based on his own knowledge, rather
than on general reputation, it is
clearly improper: Benesch v.
Waggner, 12 Colo., 534; S. C., 21
Pac. Rep., 706; Benesch v. Mitchelson, 12 Colo., 539; S. C., 21 Pac.
Rep., 708; and as it is not necessary to the impeachment of the
witness that the question be asked
at all, (Mitchell v. State (Ala.), io
So. Rep., 518), it is probably safer
to omit it altogether.
When a witness has testified to
the bad reputation of another, it is
proper to ask him on cross-examination to name the persons from
whom he heardsuch reports: Robbins v. Spencer (Ind.), 22 N. R.
Rep., 66o; Peo. v. Mather, 4 Wend.,
230; Lower v. Winters, 7 Cow., 268.
And where a witness has voluntarily testified to his own immoral
acts, it is proper to ask a witness
who testifies to the good character
of the former whether he would
allow him to visit his family, for
the purpose of ascertaining the
latter's estimate ofa good character:
State v. Brown (N. C.), 6 S. R.
Rep., 568.
(IO) The number of witnesses to
character rests in the sound discretion of the Court: Cox v. Pruitt,
25 Ind., go.
Ordinarily, one will
not be sufficient to impeach: Wafford v. State, 44 Tex., 439; at least,
to the extent of requiring a special
instruction: Rider v. State (Tex.),
9 S. W. Rep., 688.

But witnesses to character testifying in rebuttal of impeachment
may be properly limited to the
number of impeacbing witnesses:
Hollywood v. Reed, 57 Mich., 234.
(Ii) When a party to a civil action, or a defendant in a criminal
prosecution, testifies in his own behalf, his character may be assailed
equally with that of any other witness: Pratt v. Andrews, 4 N. Y.,
493; Tedens v. Schumers, 112 Ill.,
263; State v. Rainsbarger, 79 Iowa,
745; S. C., 45 N. W. Rep., 302;
Jones v. State (Ala.), ii So. Rep.,
399; State v. Parker (Mo.), 9 S.W.
Rep., 728. By so doing he brings
himself within all the rules laid
down as to other witnesses, and he
may be shown to have a bad reputation not merely for truth and
veracity, but for general morality
as well: Peo. v. Bentley (Cal.), I8
Pac. Rep., 799; Mitchell v. State
(Ala.), io So. Rep., 518; Lockard
v. Com. (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep., 266;
Hasson v. Com. (Ky.), ii S. W.
Rep., 286; Corn. v. Hourigan (Ky.),
12 S. W. Rep., 550; Crump v.
Com. (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep., 39o;
State v. Grant, 79 Mo., ii3; State
v. Palmer, 88 Mo., 568; State v.
Rider (Mo.), 8 S. W. Rep., 723;
State v. Day, 100 Mo., 242; S. C.,
12 S. W. Rep., 365; Peck v. State
(Tenn.), 6 S. W. Rep., 389; but
this reputation goes only to his
credibility as a witness, and has
not the slightest bearing upon the
main issue of the suit. Evidence
of bad character, thus rendered
competent cannot be used to prove
guilt, but only to shake the defendant's credit: State v. Broderick, 61
Vt., 421; S. C., 17 Atl. Rep., 716;
Adams v. Peo., 9 Hun. (N. Y.), 89;
State v. Robertson (S. C.), i S. B.
Rep., 443; Peo. v. Beck, 58 Cal.,
212; State v. Beal, 68 Ind., 345;
Keyes v. State, 122 Ind., 527; S. C.,
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N. E. Rep., 1097; Drew v. State,
Ind., 9; S. C., 23 N. B. Rep.,
1098.
(12) When attesting witnesses to
a will are dead, and the will is impeached on the ground of fraud in
procuring it, which fraud is imputed to the witnesses, evidence of
their good character may be given:
Stephenson v. Walker, 4 ESp., 50;
Provis v. Reed, 5 Bingh., 435. So
the bad character of a subscribivg
witness may be shown to rebut the
presumption arising from his signature: Boylan v. Meeker, 4 Dutch.
(N. J.), 274; and this will in turn
render competent evidence of his
good character in rebuttal: Black
v. Ellis, Riley (S. C.), 73. On the
same principle, when book entries
are offered in evidence, the character of the person who made them
may be attacked: Crouse v. Miller,
io S. & R., 155; Baiber v. Bull,
7 W. & S., 391; Tomlinson v.
Borst, 30 Barb. (N. Y.), 42.
(I3) As a party cannot impeach
his own witness, he cannot ordinarily offer evidence of his bad
character; but when the witness is
one whom the law obliges him to
call, as the subscribing witness to
a will, he is not bound by his testimony, if he prove hostile, but may
impeach his credit by proof of bad
reputation: Hardin v. Hays, 9 Pa.,
I5I; Williams v'. Walker, 2 Rich.
Eq., 29[; Olinde v. Saizan, io La.
An., 153; Dennett v. )Ow, 17 Me.,
19; Thornton v. Thornton, 39 Vt.,
122; Diffenderfer v. Scott (Ind.), 32
N. E. Rep., 87.
(B) Proof of Repiutation of Parties to Civil Acions.-(i) As a general rule, evidence of the character
of either party to a civil suit is inadmissible as having no bearing upon
the issue, exceptwhen he offers himself as a witness, and then goes only
23
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to his credibility: Johnson v. Wells,
Fargo & Co., 6 Nev., 224; Church
v. Drummond, 7 Ind., 17; Ins. Co.
v. Sheppard, 85 Ga., 751. It makes
no difference in this regard whether
the act charged be indictable or not:
Att.-Gen. v. Bowman, cited in note
to Huntley v. Luscombe, 2 Bos. &
Pul., 532; Cornwall v. Richardson,
Ry. & M., 305; Houghtaling v.
Kilderhouse, i N. Y., 530; Gebhart v. Burkett, 57 Ind., 378. But
if an attack be made upon it by the
pleadings, or if the form of action
is such that it becomes material to
the issue, reputation is then said to
be in issue, and may be proved:
i Strobh.
Smets v. Plunket,
(S. C. L.', 372; Gutzwiler v. Lackman, 23 Mo., 168; Rogers v. Troost,
5r Mo., 470; Gebbart v. Burkett,
supra; Williams v. Haig, 3 Rich.
L. (S. C.), 362. A party to a suit
may offer evidence of his good character when he is charged, by a plea
in recoupment, with misappropriating funds: Falkner v. Behr, 75.Ga.,
671. In an action for malpractice,
the defendant's character as a physician is in issue: Carpenter v.
Blake, io Hun. (N. Y.), 358. And
the plaintiff's character is in issue
on the question of damages in
an action for crim. con., but not
that of the wife: Pratt v. Andrews,
4 N. Y., 493.
(2) On the other hand, evidence
of the character of either party is
not admissible in an action where
it can have no possible logical influence upon the determination of
the issue. It is, therefore, not admissible in an action for the wrongful killing of another: Vawter v.
Hultz (the principal case) iMo.),
V. Rep., 689. In an action
20 S.
for assault and battery it is not
competent, either in mitigation
of damages or to rebut malice:
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Willis v. Forest, 2 Duer (N. Y.),
310; Corning v. Corning, 6 N.
Y., 97; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa.,
424; Thompson v. Church, i Root
(Conn.), 312; Givens v. Bradley,
3 Bibb. (Ky.), 195; Reed v. Kelly,

cially charging a defendant with
gross depravity and fraud, upon circumstances merely, as was the case
here, evidence of uniform integrity
and good character, is often the
only testimony which a defendant
4 Bibb. (Ky.), 4or ; Pratt v. State,
can oppose to suspicious circum56 Ind., 179; Gebhart v. Burkett,
stances;" but this was overruled by
57 Ind.i 378; Elliott v. Russell, 92
Gough v. St. John, sufira, and has
Ind., 526; Sturgeon v. Sturgeon since been wholly disregarded. Yet
(Ind.), 30 N. E. Rep., 805; Pok- it would seem to propose the fairer
riefka v. Mackurat (Mich.), 51 N. doctrine, at least in cases of circumW. Rep., o59. Neither is such stantial evidence; and this view is
evidence admissible in an action supported by Dawkins v. Gault, 5
of trespass, Cummings z). Crawford,
Rich. (S. C.), i53, and Werts v.
88 Ill., 32; Russell v. Shuster, 8 Spearman, 22 S. C., 200. -But the
W. & S., 308; for false representa- weight of authority is still so
tions, Gough v. St. John, 16 Wend.,
strongly against it that there can
646; or trover, although the tasti- hardly be claimed to be a conflict
mony practically charges the de- of decisioni, even though the mafendant with embezzlement: Wright jority opinion may seem a misv. McKee, 37 Vt., 161. This also taken one.
seems to be the rule in bastardy
(3) There is a conflict of decision
proceedings: Walker v. State, 6 on the question whether character
Blackf. (Ind.), i ; Rawles v. State, is in issue in an action for divorce:
56 Ind., 433; Sidelinger v. Buck- Ward v. Thompson, 5 Port. (Ala.),
lin, 64 Me., 371; although in Walker
382; Washburn v. Washburn, 5 N.
v. State it was held that the char- H., 195; Berdell v. Berdell, 8o Ill.,
acter of the plaintiff was put in
604; Dwyer v. Dwyer, 2 Mo. App.,
issue.
17. It has been said that it is not
This same rule, with less reason, even put in issue by the charge of
is held to apply to charges of fraud;
adultery: Humphrey v. Humphrey,
and the general doctrine is that a 7 Conn., 116; Evans v. Evans (Ky.),
mere charge of fraud does not put 20 S. W. Rep., 605; but such a
the character in issue either in ac- charge certainly is an attack upon
tions ex contractu: Atkinson v. the character of the defendant for
Graham, 5 W. (Pa.), 411; Nash v. chastity, and on the principles laid
Gilkeson,- 5 S. & R., 352; Anderson
down above would authorize rev. Long, io S. & R., 55; Battles v. butting evidence. The better opinLaudenslager, 84 Pa., 446; Fowler ion, therefore, would seem to be
v. Ins. Co., 6 Cow. (N. Y.), 673; that evidence of good character is
Smets v. Plunket, i Strobh. (S. C. admissible in such a case.. It is
L.), 372; or ex delicto: Gough v. also admissible where the libel
St. John, i6 Wend. 647; Woodruff charges cruel and disgraceful conv. Whittlesey, Kirby (Conn. , 62. duct. Du Bose v. Du Bose, 75 Ga.
The early case of Ruan v. Perry, 753. It is not competent, however:
3 Caines (N. Y.), 120, stood on
to show reputation for good or bad
much firmer ground when it held temper. Evans v. Evans (Ky.), 20
that "in actions of tort, and espe- S. W. Rep., 6o5.
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(4) The rule that does not admit
proof of character in a civil action
on a criminal charge rests on a perversion of reasoning, or rather a
wanton disregard of the plainest
principles of justice and common
sense. It is perfectly proper to exclude such evidence where it has no
bearing on the issue, as in most
civil actions; but these are not
purely civil actions because they
take that form. They are none the
less criminal in their nature, and
assail the character of the defendant not one whit less seriously
because they involve a pecuniary
and not a physical penalty. The
real point at issue is whether the
defendant was guilty of the act
complained of; and since he has
the right to show his good character
in every criminal prosecution, as
bearing upon this issue: Hanney
v. Com., ii6 Pa., 32I3; S. C., 9 Atl.
Rep., 339, he ought not to be deprived of this right because the
prosecutor has adopted a different
form of action. The mere form
has nothing to do with the merits
of the case; the real question is,
what is the point in issue? And if
that involves a criminal charge, as
bastardy, rape, adultery, or embezzlement, the defendant should
be allowed to give evidence of his
good reputation as tending to rebut
the charge. The only reason urged
against the adoption of such a rule
is that then the other party mustbe
allowed to prove bad character:
Cornwall v. Richardson, Ry. & M.,
305.
Vhy not? If the fact is
material, what objection can there
be to controverting it? and it no
more raises a side issue than any
other conflict of testimony in regard to facts. Such evidence is
admissible in malicious prosecution, and the same reasoning should

apply to similar cases.
"One
charged with a crime is not obliged
to rest upon a presumption of good
character. In favorem libertatis
he-may prove the fact, if he can, by
a weight of evidence far more
effective than any mere presumption. A plaintiff in a suit for a
malicious prosecution, has the burden of proving that the prosecution
was without probable cause. In
defending against the prosecution
he would have the right to show
his good reputation, although his
character was not attacked otherwise than incidentally by the prosecution itself. The same incidental
attack upon his character necessarily appears in the suit for the
malicious prosecution,:" McIntire
v. Levering, 148 Mass., 546; S. C.,
2o N. E. Rep., 191. It is to be
hoped that the courts will soon
abrogate this, as they have so many
other arbitrary rules of the common
law, and adopt the view which reason and justice alike commend,
that in all actions on a criminal
charge, whatever their form, the
defendant shall be allowed to prove
his good character.
(5) There are, as has been said,
certain actions which necessarily
involve the character of one or
both of the parties, either as material to the main issue, or as bearing
upon the matter of damages. These
are actions for breach of promise of
marriage, libel and slander, malicious prosecution, and seduction.
(a) Breach of Promise.-This
action does not immediately involve the character of the parties,
and, therefore, evidence of reputation is not admissible as a defense:
Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Pa., 401; but
as the plaintiff practically asserts
her character to be good by bringing the action, and as one of the
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main purposes of the suit is to -Mass., 518; Bodwell v. Swan, 3
recover damages for the loss of
Pick. (Mass.), 378. It may be adreputation occasioned by the fault
mitted under the general issue:
of the defendant, the plaintiff's
Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn., 24; Foot
character thus becomes material to
v. Tracy, i Johns. (N. Y.), 46; Padthe question of damages. It may,
dock v. Salisbury, 2 Cow. (N. Y.),
therefore, be proved bad by way of
811; Hallowell v. Guntle, 82 Ind.,
mitigation: Van. Storch v. Griffin,
554; Duval v. Davey, 32 Ohio St,
71 Pa., 240; Foulks v. Selway, 3
604; Anthony v. Stephens, i Mo.,
]Esp., 236; Irving v. Greenwood, i
254; Henry v. Norwood, 4 Watts,
C. & P., 350; Bench v. Merrick, i
347; Steinman v. McWilliams, 6
Johns. Cas. (N. Y.), II6; Willard
Pa., 17o; Sawyer v. Eifert, 2 N. &
v. Stone, 7 Cow. (N. Y.), 22; Pal- McC. (S. C.), 5ii; Richards. v.
mer v. Andrews, 7 Wend., (N. Y.),
Richards, 2 M. & R., 557; Leicester
142; Kniffen v. McConnell, 3o N.
v. Walter, 2 Camp., 251; Scott v.
Y., 285; Burnett v. Simpkins, 24
Sampson, 8 Q. B. D., 491.; or
Il.,
264. When seduction is joined
generdl issue and justification, but
with the breach, proof of plaintiff's
not justification alone: Stone 7.
character before her seduction is
Varney, 7 Metc. (Mass.), 86; Padequally admissible: Boynton v. Keldock v. Salisbury, supra; Root v.
logg, 3 Mass., I89; Green v. SpenKing, 7 Cow., 613; Vick v. Whitcer, 3 Mo., 318.
field, 2 Hayw., 222; Dewit v. Green(b) LibelandSlander.-F vidence
field; 5 Ham., 275; Bastland v.
of the good character of the plainCaldwell, 2 Bibb. (Ky.), 21; Sawyer
tiff is not rendered admissible by a
v. Hopkins, 9 Shepley, 268; Snow
libel or slander imputing a crime,
v. Converse, 3 Conn., 345; Drown
in accordance with the doubtful
v. Allen, 91 Pa., 393. When the
rule stated above, although defend- plea denies the libel, evidence of
ant gives evidence to prove the reputation is of course inadmistruth of the charge: Cornwall v.
sible: Forshee v. Abrams, 2 Iowa,
Richardson, Ryan & M., 305;
571; and so if it is not pleaded by
Houghtaling v. Kilderhouse, i N.
way of justification or mitigation :
Y., 530; Mathews v. Hunter, 9 N.
Halley v. Gregg (Iowa), 48 N. W.
H., 146; and ii fortioriis this trte
Rep., 974. The reputation proved
when the act charged is not crimmust of course correspond to the
inal: Harding v. Brooks, 5 Pick.
libelous or slanderous charge: Pad(Mass.), 244; Howland v. Geo. F.
dock v. Salisbury, 2 Cow. (N. Y.),
Blake Mfg. Co. (Mass.), 3 1 N. ]E. 8ri; Leonard v. Allen, ii Cush.
Rep., 656. But proof of his bad
(Mass.), 241; Duval v. Davey, 32
character is admissible on the ques- Ohio St., 6o4; Smith v. Buckecker,
tion of damages, on the principle
4 Rawle, 295; Conroe v. Conroe, 47
that" a reputation already damaged
Pa., 198; Moyer v. Moyer, 49 Pa.,
in the very point in controversy
27o; Drown v. Allen, 91 Pa., 393is not so valuable, commercially
When the slanderous charge is of
speaking, as a reputation which
being a thief, evidence of being a
is unspotted :" Drown v. Allen, 91
prostitute is not admissible: DougPa., 393; Conroe v. Conroe, ii * las v. Tousey, 2 Wend. (N. Y.), 352.
Wright, 198; Moyer v. Moyer, 13
Nor is reputation of being an atheist
Wright, 210; Wolcott v. Hall, 6
admissible when the slander is of
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being a perjurer: Ross v. Lapham,
14 Mass., 279. But when the libel
imputes political treachery to plaintiff, and consequent perjury to defend himself against such charges,
the defendant, under a plea of truth
in justification, may show not only
the general reputation of plaintiff
for truth and veracity, but also that
he is generally regarded in the
community as a person unworthy
of belief in political matters: Sanford v. Rowley (Mich.), 52 N. W.
Rep.,

i19.

(c) Mfalicious Prosecution.- As
the burden of proof in this action
lies upon the plaintiff to prove
want of probable cause, evidence
of his good character is admissible
to rebut the presumption against
him. The same facts that would
raise a strong suspicion against a
person of notoriously bad character,
even in the mind of a cautious and
reasonable man, would make a
slighter impression if they pointed
to the guilt of a man of good reputation: Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush
(Mass.), 2r7; McIntire v. Levering,
148 Mass., 546; S. C., 2o N. E. Rep.,
191; Scott v. Fletcher, i Overton
(Tenn.), 488; Miller v. Brown, 3
Mo., 127; S. C., 23 Am. Dec., 693;
Israel v. Brooks, 23 Ill., 575; Blizzard vu.Hays, 46 Ind., 166; Woodworth v. Mills, 61 Wis., 44- But if
the arrest is on a complaint founded
on defendant's dwn knowledge,
character can be of no avail. It is
onlyadmissible when the complaint
is founded on information and belief: Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 Ill.,
164. On the other hand his bad
character is admissible against him
to mitigate damages and to aid in
proving probable cause: Pullen v.
Glidden, 68 Me., 559; Miller v.
Brown, supra; Gregory v. Chambers, 78 Mo., 294; Winebiddle v.

Porterfield, 9 Pa., 137; Rodriguez
v. Tadmire, 2 Esp., 271; but it is
not sufficient of itself alone to establish probable cause: Newsam v.
Carr, 2 Starkie, 69.
(d) Seduction.-The character for
chastity of the seduced female is
already impeached by the fact of
seduction, and is therefore in issue:
State v. Lockerby (Minn.), 52 N. W.
Rep., 9o8; Wilson v. Sprowl, 3 Pa.,
49; Haines v. Sinclair, 23 Vt., io8;
Stowell v. Beagle, 79 Ill., 525;
White v. Murtland, 71 Ill., 250;
Hoffman v. Keirerer, 44 Pa., 452;
Dodd v. Norris, 3 Camp., 520, but
not that of the defendant: Delvee
v. Boardman, 20 Iowa, 446; nor
of the plaintiff, if a parent suing for
a daughter's seduction: Dam v.
Wyckoff, 18 N. Y., 45. The character of plaintiff's faily may be
shown to augment damages, for
the social standing of all its members is lowered by the seduction:
Wilson v. Sprowl, sutra; McAnley
v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. (N. C. L.), 28;
Thompson v. Clendinning, i Head
(Tenn.), 287; Parker v Monteith, 7
Ore., 277; Andrews v. Askey, 8 C.
& P., 7; Kendrick v. McCrary, ii
Ga., 603; contra, Haines v. Sinclair,
23 YL, io8. The character of defendant's family may be proved to
show that the plaintiff was not
derelict in allowing his daughter to
associate with him: Parker v. Monteith, supra. Specific immoral
acts cannot be shown as tending to
establish a bad reputation for chastity: State v. Rogers (Mo.), 18 S.
W. Rep., 976.
(C) ProofoflReputationin Criminal Cases.-(i) Character of Prosecutor.-Of course the reputation of
the prosecuting witness for truth
may be proved in the same manner
and subject to the same rules as
the reputation of any other witness.
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But there are certain criminal accusations which permit the prosecuting witness to be impeached by
proof of other traits of character.
These traits, however, are such as
go directly to the merits of the
prosecution. Thus the character
of the prosecutrix for chastity is in
issue in a case of rape: State v.
Foreshore, 43 N. H., 89; State v.
Knapp, 45 N. H., 148; Turney's
Case, 8 S. & M. (Miss.), lo4; State
v. Reed, 41 La. An., 581 ; S. C., 7
So. Rep., 132; and in'seduction:
State v. Lockerby (Minn.), 52 N. W.
Rep., 908.
In a prosecution for assault and
battery with intent to kill, when
defendant has claimed that he acted
in self-defense, and has introduced
evidence of threats made by the
prosecuting witness, and assaults
made by him on other persons, the
State may prove in rebuttal the
general reputation of the prosecuting witiiess for peaceableness:
Bowles v. State (Ind.), 28 N. E.
Rep., i15.
The good character of the prosecuting witness for truth and veracity cannot be proved until it has
been assailed: Cupp v. Com. (Ky.),
7 S. W. Rep., 4os; Rushing v. State
(Tex.), 8 S. W. Rep., 807.
(2) Character of Defendant.-As
has been seen, a defendant who has
offered himself as a witness may be
impeached by evidence of bad
moral character; but this evidence
goes only to his credibility, and
does not have the least tendency to
prove him guilty of the crime
charged, for evidence showing that
a man is morally capable of committing a crime is not proof that
he actually committed it: Peo. v.
Benedict, 21 N. Y. Suppl., 58. In
no other case can the character of
the defendant be attacked until he

has put it in issue by offering evidence in support of it: State v.
Ellwood (R. I.), 24 Atl. Rep., 782;
Petty v. Com. (Ky.), 15 S.W. Rep.,
1O59.
But that evidence need not
be direct. It may be brought out
on cross-examination: Reg. v. Gadbury,8 C. & P., 676; Reg. v. Shrimpton, 3 C. & K., 373Failure to prove good character
raises no presumption against the
defendant: Peo. v. Bodie, i Dana
(Ky.), 282; Peo. v. White, 24 Wqnd.
(N. Y.), 520; State v. Dockstader,
42 Iowa, 432; State v. Oikill, 7 Ired.
(N. C.), 251.
Proof of the defendant's good
moral character is admissible in
his behalf in all criminal trials,
without regard to the nature of the
offense charged. It is not a defense, but a substantive fact, to be
considered by the jury -in connection with all the other facts in the
case, as tending to show that it is
unlikely that such a person would
have committed the crime charged:
Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis., 552;
Remsen v. Peo., 43 N. Y., 6; State
v. Donovan, 6r Iowa, 278. "Good
character is an important fact with
every man; and never more so
than when he isput on trial charged
with an offense which is rendered
improbable in the last degree by a
uniform course of life wholly inconsistent with any such crime.
There are cases where it becomes a
man's sole dependence, and yet
may prove sufficient to outweigh
evidence of the most positive character. The most clear and convincing cases are sometimes satisfactorily rebutted by it, and a life
of unblemished integrity becomes
a complete shield of protection
against the most skillful web of
suspicion and falsehood which conspirators have been able to weave.
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Good character may not only raise
a doubt of guilt which would not
otherwise exist, but it may bring
conviction of innocence. In every
criminal trial it is a fact which the
defendant is at liberty to put in
evidence; and being in, the jury
have a right to give it such weight
as they think it entitled to:"
CooLEY, J., in Peo. v. Garbutt, 17
Mich., 9; Felix v. State, iS Ala.,
72o; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala., 380;
Harrison v. State, 37 Ala., 154;
Hall v. State, 40 Ala., 698; Springfield v. State (Ala.), ii So. Rep.,
250; Kistler v. State, 54 Ind., 400;
McQueen v. State, 82 Ind., 72;
Wagner v. State, 107 Ind., 71; S. C.,
7 N. B. Rep., 896; 57 Am. Rep., 79;
Hopps z. Peo., 31 Ill., 388; Peo. v.
Ashe, 44 Cal., 288; Peo. v. Bell, 49
Cal., 485; State v. Turner, 19 Iowa,
r44; State v. Gustafson, 50 Iowa,
194; Coleman v. State, 59 Miss.,
484; Schaller v. State, 14 MO., 502;
State v. O'Connor, 31 Mo., 389;
State %. McMurphy, 52 Mo., 251;
Kee v. State, 28 Ark., 155; Griffin
v. State, 14 Ohio St., 55; Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St., 264; State
v. Beebe, 17 Minn., 241; Lee zv
State, 2 Tex. App., 339; Lockart v.
State, 3 Tex. App., 567; State v.
Henry,5 Jones (N. C. L.), 65; State
v. Wells, Coxe (N. J.), 424;. Peo. v.
Mead, 50 Mich., 233; S. C., 15 N.
XV. Rep., 95; Peo. 'v. Moett, 23 Hun.
(N. Y.), 6o; Stover v. Peo., 56 N. Y.,
315; Cathcart v. CoM., 37 Pa., io8;
Kilpatrick v. Com., 8i Pa., 198;
Becker v. Com. (Pa.), 9 Atl. Rep.,
5 o; State v. Edwards, 13 S. C., 30;
Com. v. Leonard, 140 Mass., 479;
S. C., 4 N. R. Rep., 96; Com. v.
Wilson (Mass.), 25 N. E. Rep., i6;
State v. Daley, 53 Vt., 442; Peo. v.
Hancock (Utah), 25 Pac. Rep.,1o93;
U. S. v. Jackson, 29 Fed. Rep., 503;
U. S. v. Jones, 31 Fed. Rep., 718;
17

R. v. Stannard, 7 C. & P., 673;
State v. Donohoo, 22 XV. Va., 761;
Shropshire v. State, 81 Ga., 589;
S. C., 8 S. R. Rep., 4oo; Hodgkins
v. State (Ga.), 15 S. E. Rep., 695;
Holland v. State (Ind.), 31 N. .
Rep., 359; State v. Levigne (Nev.),
30 Pac. Rep., io84; Peo. v. Formosa,
i6 N. Y. Suppl., 753; Peo. v. Sweeney (N. Y.), 3o N. R. Rep., 1005;
(aff. S. C., 59 Hun. (N. Y.), 619 ; 13
N. Y. Suppl., 25); Peo. v. Harrison,
53 N. W. Rep., 725. Its force is, of
course, to be determined by the
jury from all the attendant circumstances: Cancemi v. Peo., 16 N. Y.,
Sor, though its effect is naturally
greater when the evidence is circumstantial: Jackson v. State
(Wis.), 51 N. W. Rep., 89. It is
not requisite that the case should
be doubtful in order to justify its
admission: U. S. v. Gunnell, 5
Mackey (D. C.), 196; State v. Barth,
25 S. C., 175; State v. Howell, oo
Mo., 628; Long v. State, 23 Neb.,
33; S. C., 36 N. V. Rep., 31o; Johnson v. State (Neb.), 5i N. W. Rep.,
835; for evidence of character
alone may be sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt: Peo. v. Pollock,
4 N. Y. Suppl., 298; S. C., 5t Hun.
(N. Y.), 613; Bacon v. State, 22 Fla.,
5i; Klehn v. Territory, I Vash. St.,
584; S. C., 21 Pac. Rep., 31; Heine
v. Com., 91 Pa., 145; Hanney v.
Coin., ti6 Pa., 323; 8. C., 9 At].
Rep., 339.
It has even been
claimed that character was sufficient to rebut the presumption of
guilt arising from the possession
of recently stolen property: Clackner z. State, 33 Ind., 4r2; State v.
Kennedy, 88 Mo., 34r, or to conclusively establish innocence in
doubtful cases; but these claims
are against the great weight of authority: Vagner v. State, 107 Ind.,
71; Cole v. State (Miss.), 4 So. Rep.,
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57i- Proof of defendant's good
character must be prior to the commission of the alleged crime:
Graham v. State (Tex.), 13 S. W.
Rep., io3.
When the evidence of guilt is
direct, proof of good character goes
only to its credibility: Stover v.
Peo., 56 N. Y., 315; Peo. v. Shepardson, 49 Cal., 629; Peo. v. Bell,
49 Cal., 485; State v. Alexander, 66
Mo., 148; and when that proof is
clear and positive it cannot prevail against it: State v. Turner, 19
Iowa, 149; State v. McMurphy, 52
Mo., 251; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush.
(Mass.), 295; State v. Levigne, 17
Nev., 435; State v. Douglass (Kan.),
24 Pac. Rep., iiiS; U. S. v. Mians,
42 Fed. Rep., 579; Peo. v. Spriggs,
ii N. Y. Suppl., 433; S. C., 58
Hun. (N. Y.), 6o3; Peo. v. Sweeney,
13 N. Y. Suppl., 25; S. C., 59 Hun.
(N. Y.), 619; aff., 30 N., E. Rep.,
oo5; Peo. v. Drown, 14 Y. V.
Suppl., 740; Peo. v. Brooks kN. Y.),
30 N. E. Rep., 189; aff. S. C., 15
N. Y. Suppl., 362.
Of course, ;when defendant has
offered evidence of good character,
it may be rebutted: State v. PFope,
100 To.,2 347; S. C, 13 S. W. Rep.,
490.
Evidence of good character "nay
be negative. The best character is
that which is least talked P'3out:
Reg. v. Cary, IO Cox C. C., 25;
Hussey'v. State, 87 Ala., 121; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 420; State v. Lee,
22 Minn., 407; S. C., 21 Am. Rep.,
796; Gandolfo v. State, ii Ohio St.,
114; State v. Nelson; 68 Iowa, 208.
Evidence of the moral character
of the accused is admissible to determine the grade of the offense
in homicide: Carroll v. State, 3
Humph. (Tenn.), 315; and to aid
the Court in determining the sentence to be imposed: State v. Summers (N. C.), 4 S. E. Rep., 120.

. When the defendant offers evidence, not of general moral character, but of specific traits, it
should correspond with the trait
involved in the offense, or it will
be inadmissible. Kahlenbeck v.
State, 119 Ind., 118; S. C., 21 N. E.
Rep., 46o; Walker v. State, 102
Ind., 502; Peo. t,.
Stewart, 28 Cal.,
395; Kee v. State, 28 Ark., 155;
State v. Kiley, 43 Iowa, 294; State v.
Pearce, 15 Nev., 188; State v. King,
78 Mo., 555; State v. Emery (Vt.),
7 AUt. Rep., 129. In prosecution
for homicide, defendant may show
his reputation for peace and quietude: State v. Sterrett, 68 Iowa,
76; State v.. Cross, 68 Iowa, i8o;
Morgan v. State, 88 Ala., 223;-S. C.,
6 So. Rej., 761; Gibson v. State, 89
Ala., 121; S. C., 8 So. Rep, 98;
even where the charge is of murder
by poisoning, for poisoning involves
an assault: Hall v. State (Ind.),
31 N. E. Rep., 536; but not for
honesty, truth or integrity:' Peo. v.
Cowgill (Cal.), 29 Pac., 228; or that
he was a good soldier: Peo. v. Garbutt 17 Mich., 9. In a prosecution
for assault and' battery, reputation
for truth and veracity is irrelevant:
Morgan v. State, 88 Ala., 223; S.
C., 6 So. Rep., 761. In a prosecution for larceny, the reputation of
the defendant for honesty may be
proved: State v. Bloom, 68 Ind.,
54. Evidence offered in rebuttal
should meet the proof it is intended to rebut; and when the accused in a prosecution for adultery
gave evidence of good character, it
was held reversible error to admit
evidence that he "was foolishly
fond of women;" for such does not
prove a reputation for adultery or
fornication: Cauley v. State (Ala.),
9 So. Rep., 456.
Evidence of specific acts is not
admissible: State v. Rogers (Mo.),
iS S. W. Rep., 976; Hussey v.
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State, 87 Ala., 12r; S. C., 6 So.
Rep., 420; Alexander v. Com., 1o5
Pa., i; except on cross-examination, for the purpose of testing the
witness' estimate of character, or
to prove his testimony inconsistent
with facts known to him: State
r,.
Merriman (S. C.), 12 S. E. Rep.,
b19.

(3)Character of Deceased in
Cases of Homicide.-When the defendant pleads self-defense, he may
introduce evidence of the violent
and dangerous character of the deceased: Abbott v. Peo., 86 N. Y.,
46o; State v. Field, 14 Me., 248; S.
C., 31 Am. Dec., 52; Ripley v.
State, 2 Head (Tenn.), 217; Aber-

nethy v. Com., ioi Pa., 322; Franklin v. State, 29 Ala., 19; Perry v.
State (Ala.), io So. Rep., 65o; Field
v. State, 47 -Ala., 6o3; Jackson v.
State, 77 Ala., I8; State v. Chandler, 5 La. An., 489; S. C., 52 Am.
Dec., 599; State v. Robertson, 3o
La. An., "340; Cotton 'v. State, 31
Miss., 5o4; State v. Keene, 5o Mo.,
357; State v. Bryant, 55 Mo., 75;
State v. Elkins, 63 Mo., 159; State
v. Hayden, 83 Mo., 198. The mere
fact that he possessed such a character, however, is not enough to
justify its admission in evidence,
without proof that it was known to
defendant, or that he made the
first assault upon- the latter: May
v. Peo., 8 Col., 2xo; Lang v. State
(Ala.), 4 So. Rep., 193; Ty. v. Harper,
I Ariz., 399; S. C., 25 Pac. Rep.,
528; Cannon v. Peo. (Ill.), 30 N. E.
Rep., 1027; King v. State (Ark.),
19 S. W. Rep., 11o; Trabune v.
Com. (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep., 186;
Garner v. State, 28 Fla, 113; S. C.,
9 So. Rep., 835; State v.Downs, 91
Mo., ig; State v. Labuzan, 37 La.
An., 489; State v. Janvier, 37 La.
An., 645; State z. Jackson, 37 La.
An., 896; State z. Taylor (La.), i i

So. Rep., 132; State v. McCarthy
(La.), 9 So. Rep., 493; Evers v.
State (Tex.), 2o S. W. Rep., 744.
The mere bad character of the deceased cannot, of itself, effect the
guilt of the accused: Chase v. State;
46 Miss., 633; State v. Keene, 50
Mo., 357; Corn. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa.,
386; Prickett v. State, 22 Ala., 39;
S. C., 58 Am. Dec., 25o; State v.
Hogue, 6 Jones (N. C. L.), 383;
State v. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.),
562. The decision of the question
whether a sufficient basis has been
laid for the introduction of deceased's character rests largely in
the discretion of the trial judge;
the uncorroborated testimony of a
single witness, who is contradicted
by others, is not sufficient: State z'.
Ford, 37 La. An., 443.
This evidence is inadmissible
when the defendant does not plead
self-defense, but denies the killing,
Manning v. State 'Wis.), 48 N. W.
Rep., 209; when there was no hostile demonstration on his part toward defendant, nor any reason for
the latter to believe himself in peril;
State v. Mitchell, 41 La. An., 1073;
S. C., 6 So. Rep., 785; King v State,
9o Ala., 612 ; S. C., 8 So. Rep., 856,
and when the defendant is the aggressor. De Arman v. State, 71
Ala. 351; Bond v. State, 21 Fla.,
738; State v. Rose, 47 Minn., 47;

S. C., 49 N. XV. Rep., 404. IEvidence of specific acts of violence
cannot be given: State v. Parker,
(Mo.), 9 S. W. Rep., 728; King v.
State, 65 Miss., 576; S. C., 5 So.
Rep., 97; fnd evidence of violent
character many years before in a
foreign country, is inadmissible.
May v. Peo., 8 Col., 210.
The prosecution cannot show the
peaceable character of the deceased
until it has been attacked: Ben v.
State, 37 Ala., 1o 3 ; Peo. v. Ander-
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son, 39 Cal., 704 i Pea. v. Bezy, 67
Cal., 223; but when the defendant
has been convicted on direct proof,
the admission of such evidence is
harmless error. Webb v. Com.,
(Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep., 769. When
attacked, the attack may be rebutted
by proof of a peaceable and quiet
disposition: Hussey v. State, 87 Ala.,
121; S. C., 6 So. Rep., 420; Davis
v. Peo., 114 Ill., 86; S. C., 29 N. E.
Rep., 192, but the rebutting evidence must meet the direct, and
proof of a violent disposition is not
met by evidence that deceased had
not the character of being a bad
boy. The two traits are not the
same. Martin v. State (Ala.) 8 So.
Rep., 858.

SMITH

V. SMITH,'

D. The character of a house, as
a nuisance, a bawdy house, etc.,
may be shown by evidence of the
reputation of the persons who frequent it, or the reputation in which
it is held. State v. Bunnell, 29
Wis., 435; Betts v. State, 93 Ind.,
375; Whitlock v.,State (Ind.), 30
N. E. Rep., 934; State v. Fleming,
(Iowa), 53 N. W. Rep., 235.
[NoTE.-Very instructive and interesting articles on this general
subject, containing a number of
cases not cited here, will be found
in 3o Cent. L. J., 241; 31 Cent. L.
J., 229; 3A . &E. En. of Law, i1on8.]

A-RDEMUS STEWART.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF

MASSACHUSETTS.

NMon-exbert Obinion- Testamentary Capiacity.
Onthe trial of an issue whether the testator was of sound mind, a
witness who had observed the ,mental and physical condition of the testator for twenty years, but who was neither an attesting witness to the
will, an attending physician, nor an expert in matters of mental condition,
was asked "whether, from the general appearance of the testator, he
considered him capable of making a contract, or of transacting important
business." Held, that the question called for an opinion on the mental
condition of the testator, and was properly excluded.
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF NON-EXPERT TESTIMONY TO SHOW MENTAL
INCAPACITY.

The history of the development ticipate the requirements of new
of legal principles and rules of pro- phases of fact.
The broad rule of evidence which
cedure shows the impossibility of
formulating such rules as shall an-'- confines the testimony of witnesses
'32 N. E. Rep., 348.
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to facts alone, and gives to the jury
the sole right to draw the inferences suggested by the facts, has its
source in the danger of prejudicing
the interest of a party to the cause
by swaying the jury by opinions
relative to the facts expressed by
persons unconnected with him:
Best Ev., 495. The difficulty in
applying this rule in strictness
arises from two causes: First, the
growth of learned sciences and of
special branches of knowledge; and
second, the vagueness which is inherent in the distinction between
matter of fact and matter ofopinion.
In the first case it is patent that a
necessity has arisen, and has at
no time been more imperative
than at present, to call as witnesses men skilled in the various
departments of knowledge, for the
purpose of informing the jury as to
the proper deductiohs and inferences to be drawn from given facts
according to the light of science,
concerning which men having no
special training are ignorant.
In the second case, it is impossible in many instances to admit evidence of the facts in question without letting in at the same time the
opinion of the witness upon those
facts. "In all supposed statements
of fact the witness really testifies,
consciously or unconsciously, to
the opinion formed by his judgment upon the presentment of his
senses. Statement of opinion is
therefore necessarily involved in
statement of fact." Whart. Ev., P415.
To attain the highest justice in any
given case the best evidence must
always be obtainable and admissible. When, in answer to the question, "What is the best evidence ?"
we discover that to admit what we
have found,will infringe upon a rule
of procedure, justice demands, not

that evidence be castaside, northat
the rule be abrogated, but that an
exception or modification of the
rule be formulated.
In Omychund v. Barker, i Atk.,
19, Lord HARDWICKE said: "The
judges and sages of the law have
laid it down that there is but one
general rule of evidence-' the best
the nature of the case will admit.'"
The testimony of non-expert witnesses in matters of opinion may
be divided as follows:
(I) Where in stating the facts an
opinion is expressed ezizecessitate,
as. where a witness is desired to
describe a sound, a color, an appearance, the identity of one object or thing with another, questions of value, etc.
(2) Where the witness gives his
opinion as to a matter depending
upon special knowlege, having
stated the facts upon which he
bases his opinion (Whart. Ev.,
; 515); as the apparent extent
of suffering of an individual to
whom the witness was nurse:
Heddles v. Chicago & N. W. Rwy.
Co. (Wis.), 46 N. IV., p. 5 (1891);
the safety or convenience of highways, the witness being familiar
with highways and their use:
Laughlin v. StreetRwy., 62 Mich.,
220; the effect of liquor on one
with whom the witness is familiar:
Cole v. Bean, I Ariz., 377; People
v. Monteith (Cal.), 14, P. 373; as
to values, rentals, etc. : Wood z.
Baylis, io N. Y. S., 62; Chamberlain v. Dunlop, 8 N. Y. S., 125.
In issues devisavit vel non,
and in actions to determine the
validity of deeds, there has been
much conflict and fluctuation of
authority as to the admissibility
of non-expert testimony to determine the mental capacity of
the testator or grantor Insanity,
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while in many cases the expert's
peculiar province of inquiry, yet is
shown in so many ways that are
plain to the ordinary observer, that
expert testimony is not only unnecessary, but the best evidence
obtainable is undoubtedly that of
those who have had special opportunities for observing the individual by their association with him.
Non-expert testimony in cases of
insanity is divided into (a), that of
attesting witnesses of wills; and
(b), that of all other non-experts.
The admissibility of testimony
of the first class is not questioned
by any authority, but is confined to
the attesting witnesses of wills
alone, excluding the testimony of
the attesting witnesses of deeds,
who are on the same plane as all
other non-experts: Egbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa., 326. The subscribing
witnesses to a will may always give
their opinions concerning the sanity or insanity of the testator at
the time he signed the will in their
presence, "whether they happen to
be attending physicians, nurses,
children, or chance strangers." The
distinction is made because their
signatures to the will are an assertion that the testator was of sound
mind when he signed it: Poole v.
Richardson, 3 Mass., 330; May v.
Bradlee, 127 Mass., 414; Com. v.
Brayman, 136 Mass., 414; Culon v.
Haslam, -7 Barb., 314; Clapp v.
Fullerton, 34 N. Y., 19o; Brand v.
Brand, 39 How. Pr. Rep., 193; Van
Huss v. Rainbolt, 42 Tenn., .39;
Unes v. Lee, et al., 47 Md., 321;
Potts v. House, 6 Ga., 334; Irish v.
Smith, 8 S. & R., 573; Logan v.
McGinnis, 12 Pa., 27; Eckert v.
Flowry, 43 Pa., 46. Many cases
decide that the opinions of thesubscribing witnesses as to the capacity of the testator are admissi-

ble without first receiving testimony of the facts upon which the
opinion is based: Poole v. Richardson, 3 Mass., 330 (1807); Com. V.
Brayman, 136 Mass., 438 (1884);
Logan v. Maginnis, 12 Pa., 27
(1849); Eckert v. Flowry, 43 Pa.,
46 (1862), Titlow v. Titlow, 54 Pa.,
216 (1867); Williams v. Lee, el al.,
47 Md., 32r; Van Huss v. Rainbolt,
elal., 42 Tenn. (2 Cold.), 139; Potts,
el al., v. House. 6 Ga., 334.
The conflict of authority is upon
the admission of witnesses who are
neither experts nor subscribing witnesses to wills to give their opinion
as to mental capacity.. That the
best authority favors the competency of such evidence there
is not a doubt. In State v. Pike,
49 N. H., 408, 4o9, DOil, J., in his
dissenting opinion, says: "That
in England no express decision of
the point can be found, for the
reason that such evidence has always been admitted without objection. It has been universally
regarded as so clearly competent
that it seems no English lawyer
has ever presented to any court
any objection, question or doubt in
regard to it. But in Wright v'.
Tatham, 5 Cl.& Fin., 670; S. C., 4
Bing., N. C., 489, the question was
involved in such a manner and the
number and strength of the judicial
opinions were such as to make that
case an authority of the greatest
weight in favor of the competency
of the evidence. In his dissenting
opinion, filed in Boardman v.Woodman, 47 N. H., 144, the same judge
says: 'Since the decision in Dewitt
v. Bailey, 9 N. Y., 371, was Overruled in the same case, 17 N. Y.,
340, there has been almost perfect
unanimity of authority in favor of
such testimony. The supposition
that such testimony was not re-
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ceived in the English common law
courts is erroneous : Eagleton v.
Kingston, 8 Ves., Jr., 439, 449, 450;
452; Tatham v. Wright, 2 Kuss. &
Myl., , pp. 375, 376 of Ingraham's
edition; Lowe v. Joliffe, i 'V. Bl.,
365; Attorney-General v. Pamther,
3 Br. C. C., 441, 442; King v. Arnold, i6. St. Tr., 695, 7o6, el seq.
King v. Terress, i9 St. Tr., 885, 923,
et seq.' "
In the United States Supreme
Court non-expert opinion in issues
of insanity is admitted. In the
case of Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Lathrop, iii U. S., 6[2, the
Court decided that the answer of a
witness, who had previously testi.
flied as to the appearance of the
person whose sanity was in question, to the question, "What was
the impression left upon your mind
by the conduct, actions, manners
expressions and conversation of
P.?" that "he was crazy and
didn't know what he was doing,"
and "I thought he was out of his
head," was properly admitted in
evidence. "Whether an individual
is insane is not always solved by
abstruse metaphysical speculation,
expressed in the technical language
of medical science. The common
sense, and, we may add, the natural
instincts of mankind, reject the
supposition that only experts can
approximate certainty upon such
a subject. While the mere opinion
of a non-professional witness, predicated upon facts detailed by others,
is incompetent as evidence upon an
issue of insanity, his judgment,
based upon personal knowledge of
the circumstances involved in such
an inquiry, certainly is of ',alue,
because the natural and ordinary
operations of the human intellect
and the appearance and conduct of
insane persons, as contrasted with

the appearance and conduct of persons of sound mind, are more or
less understood and recognized by
every one of ordinary intelligence
who comes in contact with his
species. The extent to which such
opinions should influence or control
the judgment of the court or jury
must depend upon the intelligence
of the witness, as manifested by
his examination, and upon his opportunities to ascertain all the circumstances that should properly
affect any conclusion reached."
See also Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S.,
430, 437, elseq.; Parkhurst v. Horsford (C. C. D. Oregon, 1884), 21
Fed. Rep., 827.
The New York Rule.-F. S. Rice,
Esq., in his recently published
work on "Evidence," at p. 348,
cites the New York rule as being
the "most satisfactory, and has the
additional advantage of being well
understood and settled beyond
cavil bya long line of adjudication."
The rule as accepted is laid down
in Clapp. v. Fullerton, 17 N. Y.,
340 (I866), that where non-professional witnesses, who did not attest
the execution of a will, are examined as to matters within their own
observation, bearing upon the competency of the testator, they may
characterize, as in their opinion
rational or irrational, the acts and
declarations to which they testify;
but the examination must be
limited to their conclusions from
the specific facts they disclose, and
they cannot be permitted to express
their opinions on the general question whether the mind of the
testator was sound or unsound.
Real v. State, 42 N. Y., 270; Howell
v. Taylor, fi Hun., 214; Arnold's
Will, 14 Hun., 525; Bell z. McMasters; 29 Hun., 272 ; Ross' Will, 87
N.Y., 514; Holcomb v. Holcomb,
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95 N. Y., 316; People v. Conroy,
97 N. Y., 62. This rule confines
the testimony of each witness to
the designation as rational or
otherwise those particular acts of
the individual which have come
under his personal observation. By
excluding testimony as to the
general issue, the jury are permitted
to determine the question by considering the conclusions drawn by
each witness from the facts observed
by him.
The ConnecticutRule.-In Shanley's Appeal, decided on November
1,

1892,

in the Supreme Court of

Errors of Connecticut, the action
of the lower court in admitting the
question, whether from the witness' observation of the testatrix
he could say she was of sound

mind, was approved by

ANDRXWS,

C. J., quoting the opinion of
LooMIs, J., upon the same question
in Sydleman v. Beckwith, 43 Conn.,
9. "It is in all cases important,
with a view to confirm the opinion,
that the witness should be able to
state such facts as will show presumptively that his opinion is well
founded. But it is not quite correct to say that the opinion of a
witness is entitled to consideration
only so far as the facts stated by
him sustain the opinion, unless the
,proposition is understood to include, among the facts referred to,
the acquaintance ofthe witness with
the subject-matter, and his opportunities for observation. The very
basis upon which, as we have seen,
this exception to the general rule
rests, is that the nature of the subject-matter is such that it cannot
be reproduced or detailed to the
jury precisely as it appeared to the
testator at the time." The distinction between the rules is that in
any case the New York rule will

not permit non-expert testimony
upon the general issue, while the
Connecticut rule measures the
opinion .the witness may give .by
his acquaintance and opportunities
for observation. (See opinion in
Shanley's Appeal. sufra.) Although the authority given prefers
the New York rule, yet it is difficult
to see that its operation will be
widely different from that of the
Connecticut rule. In a case like
that of Shanley's Appeal, where the
acquaintance and opportunities for
observing the testatrix .extended
over a considerable period, testimony that her acts and conduct
within that period were rational or
irrational is no less than direct testimony of-sanity or insanity. The
advantage of the New York rule is
that it still preserves the jury in
their capacity as triers of the issue,
and enables them, as has been said,
to form an opinion from the conclusions drawn by each witness
from the facts observed by him.
In few of the States, however, do
the reported cases indicate anything further than that the exception to the broad rule of evidence
is recognized, and witnesses who
are not experts may state their
opinions after giving the facts upon
which they are based. Whletber
these opinions must be given according to the Connecticut or New
York rules cannot be ascertained.
In Pennsylvania the courts seem
to lean to the admission of testimony of the general issue based
upon knowledge of particular facts.
Thus in Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa.,
342, the Court said: "In Pennsylvania it has always been the rule
that after a non-professional witness has stated the facts upon which
his opinion is founded he is permitted to state his opinion as to the
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sanity or insanity of the testator."
See also Rambler v. Lyon, 7 S. and
R., go; Urgan v. Small, ii S. and
R., 34T; Titlow v. Titlow, 4 P. F. S.,
216; Dickinson v. Dickinson, Ix P.
F. S., 401; Bank v. Wirebach's
Executors, 12 WV. N. 15o; Swails,
Appellant, v. White, i Adv. Rep.,
856 (1892). In the case of Conn.
Life Ins. Co. v. Lathrop, iiI U. S.,
612, the court favor testimony of
the general issue. See also 4i Tex.,
125; 20 Nev., 333; Crim. Law
Mag., 72; 51 Vt. 296; 61 Vt., 534;
Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H., 227; 9
R. I., 377.
Favoring the New York rule, see
44 Iowa, 229; 5 Blackf. (Ind.), 217;
56 Ind., 343; 69 Ind., io8; 75 Ind.,
5rI; 123 Ind., 337; io9 Ill., 69; 71
Ala., 385; 59 Cal., 392.
The 1llassachisells Rule.-In
Massachusetts, the case of Poole v.
Richardson, 3 Mass., 330 (1807), the
court permitted the subscribing
witnesses to the will to give their
opinions as to the sanity of the
testator, and permitted other witnesses to testify to the appearance
of the testatbr, and to any particular
facts from which the state of his
mind'might be inferred, but not
merely their opinion or judgment.
In commenting upon the case, Doe,
J., in State v. Pike (49 N. H., 399),
says: "There is reason to suspect
that the only point ruled in this
case was that the witnesses were
allowed to give their opinions when
they stated the particular facts from
which the. state of the testator's
mind was inferred by them." This
case is the corner-stone upon which
the Massachusetts courts have built
their rule, and it is certain that in
subsequent cases the error has been
perceived and regretted. In Baxter v'. Abbott, 7 Gray. 71. 79,
TuoMAS, J., said: "If it were a

new question I should be disposed
to allow every witness to give his
opinion subject to cross-examination upon the reasons upon which
it is based, his degree of intelligence and his means of observation." Some of the later cases
indicate a tendency to escape to
some extent the evil effects of the
rule by the circuitous method of a
mere technical distinction. Thus
in Nash v. Hunt, 116 Mass., 237
(1874), the Court (WELS, J.), pronounced that the answer of a
witness that "he perceived nothing unusual or singular respecting 'the testator's mental condition I was competent, not being an
expression of opinion as to condition of the mind itself, but only of
its manifestation in conversation."
Again, in Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, I7 Mass., 122, 133, a witness
was permitted to give "the conclasion of fact to which his judgment,
observation and common knowledge has led him in regard to a
subject-matter which requires no
special learning or experiment, but
which is within the knowledge of
men in general."
And in Com. v. Brayman, 136
Mass., 438 (1884), COLBURN, J., decided that a person of ordinary in-,
telligence, who was familiarly acquainted with an individual, might
testify whether within a given time
he has failed mentally or physically, but might not give his opinion upon the facts upon which this
conclusion is based. It seems that
this opinion is self-contradictory.
To say that a man has failed mentally or physically within a given
time is not a conclusion of fact, but
a conclusion from fact, and is a
matter of opinion just as much as
to describe a sound or color. In
McCarmel v. Wildes, 153 Mass.,
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487 (1891), it was permitted to ask
an executor whether he bad observed any fact which led him to infer any derangement of intellect,
with the qualification that he
was to state facts only. The natural conclusion would be that
this decision sounded the note of
emancipation from the bondage
of the rule, and the decision
of Smith v. Smith, in 1892, certainly may be the subject of legitimate surprise. In State v. Pike,
the Court in commenting upon
Poole v. Richardson, says: "If the
Court had been aware that this rul
ing overturned all the authorities
and the uniform practice in England and America from the beginning of the common law to that day,
it is not to be presumed that the
ruling would have been made without a formal opinion reduced to
writing by some member of the
Court, formally delivered and formally reported, giving some reason
for the innovation. If they had
been conscious of the novel and
revolutionary character of the precedent, they would not have intro
duced it: so summarily and incon
siderately."
When, in 1820, the eastern counties of Massachusetts became the
S.tate of Maine, the rule of the
Massachusetts courts was adhered
to. In Wyman v. Gould, 47 Me.,
159 t1859), it was held that an expert only can be permitted to state
how a party "appeared," in respect
to soundness or unsoundness of
mind.
In Snow v. Boston &
Maine, 65 Me., 230, however, nonexpert opinion was held to be admissible where it is founded upon
knowledge open to all, and is the
result of personal knowledge, and
relates to the ordinary affairs of
life, such as the value of property,
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the appearance or identity of person, etc. And in Fayette v. Chesterville, 77 Me., 28, the Court said:
"The tendency in our practice has
been to allow witnesses not experts
a good deal of latitude in the expression of opinion short of declaring their judgments upon the point
and directly in issue." Thus, in
Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me.. 410,
a witness was permitted to say that
she observed no failure of mind
and nothing peculiar. The tendency of the Maine decisions do, it
is true, tend toward a recognition
of the exception to the rule of exclusion, but as yet they strive to
adhere to the old rule, bending it as
circumstances may require.
In New Hampshire the courts excluded all non-expert opinion until
the decision of Hardy v. Merrill, 56
N. H., 227 (1875), which overruled
the decisions of Boardman v.Woodman, 47 N. H., 12o, and State v.
Pike, 49 N. H., 399. In the latter
case a strong dissenting opinion
was filed by Doz, J., which is
quoted freely, supra. From the
cases cited in the learned opinion
of FOSTER, C.J., in Hardy v. Merrill, it appears that,notwithstanding
the decisions above cited, that the
Massachusetts exception to the
universal rule never was really established in New Hampshire, as the
case of Hamblett v. Hamblett, 6
N. H., 333 (1833), which in Boardman v. Woodman was called the
"corner-stone of the established
usage," not only does not support
the doctrine, in whose aid it was
invoked, but is in conflict with the
earlier cases of State v. Ryan (1811);
Trial of Daniel D. Fanner (1821);
Trial of Amos Furnal (1825); State
v. Conay (i83o); see Hardy v. Merrill, 56 N. H., 236, et seq.
Texas is named by the text-

